We identify a pervasive contrast in logic between what we call implicit and explicit stances in design. Implicit systems change the meaning of logical constants and sometimes also the definition of consequence, while explicit systems conservatively extend classical systems with new vocabulary.
Explicit and implicit stances in logical analysis
The history of logic has themes running a spectrum from description of ontological structures in the world to elucidating patterns in inferential or communicative behavior. The mathematical foundational era added the methodology of formal systems with semantic notions of truth and validity and matching proof calculi. This modus operandi is standard fare, enshrined in the major systems of the field.
But live disciplines are not finished fields but advancing quests. Logic has a growing agenda, including the study of information, knowledge, belief, action, agency, and other key topics in philosophical logic or computational logic. How are such topics to be brought into the scope of the established mathematical methodology? There are both modifications and extensions of classical logic for these purposes, and the aim of this paper is to point at two main lines, representing a sort of watershed.
One line of enriching classical logic adds new operators for new notions to be analy- We will discuss a sequence of illustrations displaying the contrast, and analyze what makes it tick. We set the scene by recalling some key facts about two well-known systems: epistemic logic and intuitionistic logic, presented with a focus on information and knowledge. After that we discuss less standard cases such as logics of information update, default reasoning, games, quantum mechanics, and truth making.
Throughout, we take explicit and implicit approaches seriously as equally natural stances, and we discuss new logical questions suggested by their co-existence. Our final conclusion from all this will be that the interplay of the two stances needs to be grasped and appreciated, as it raises many new points and open problems concerning the architecture of logic, while it also has philosophical repercussions.
This may not be an easy paper to classify qua style or results, but we hope that the reader will benefit from looking at logical system design in our broad manner.
Information, knowledge, and epistemic logic
A natural addition to the heartland of logic are notions of knowledge and information for agents, that have been part of the discipline from ancient times until today, [35] , [7] . In what follows we do not need intricate contemporary logics for epistemology, [32] , interesting and innovative though these are. The contrast in modus operandi we are after can be seen at much simpler level, dating back to the 1960s.
Here is a major explicit way of taking knowledge and information seriously. We add modal operators for knowledge to propositional logic, and study the laws of the resulting epistemic logics on top of classical logic. These conservative operator ex-tensions of classical logical systems have interesting structure and modeling power, also for notions beyond knowledge, such as belief. Hence epistemic logic is used in many disciplines: philosophy, linguistics, computer science, and economics.
In more detail, the classic [31] proposes an analysis of knowledge that involves an intuitive conception of information as a range of candidates for the real situation ('world', 'state'). This range may be large, and we know little, or small (perhaps as a result of prior information updates eliminating possibilities) and then we know a lot. In this setting, an agent knows that ϕ at a current world s if ϕ is true in all worlds in the current range of s, the epistemically accessible worlds from s via a binary relation s ~ t. To express reasoning in a matching syntax, we take standard propositional logic as a base, and add a clause for formulas of the form Kϕ -subscripted to
Kiϕ for different indices i in case we want to distinguish between different agents i.
Then the preceding intuition becomes the following truth definition: This extends classical propositional logic: the base clauses are standard, with one operator clause added. Epistemic accessibility ~ is often taken to be an equivalence relation -but we can vary on this if needed. The resulting logic is S5 for each single agent, without non-trivial bridge axioms relating knowledge of different agents.
M, s |= p iff s ∈ V(p)
Thus, basic epistemic logic is a conservative extension of classical logic, and the same holds for variations like S4 or S4.2 that encode other intuitions concerning knowledge, [46] . More intricate laws hold for modalities of common or distributed knowledge in groups, but again these will not be not needed here.
Few people today see the epistemic modality as a conclusive analysis for the full philosophical notion of knowledge. But even so, this system is a perfect fit for another basic notion, the 'semantic information' that an agent has at her disposal, cf.
the classic source [6] . And, the simple perspicuous explicit syntax of epistemic logic is still in wide use as a lingua franca for framing epistemological debates, for instance, for or against such basic principles of reasoning about knowledge as Intuitionistic logic arose in the analysis of constructive mathematical proof, with logical constants acquiring their meanings in proof rules via the Brouwer-HeytingKolmogorov interpretation. In the 1950s, Beth and Kripke proposed models over trees of finite or infinite sequences, and in line with the idea of proof as establishing a conclusion, intuitionistic formulas are true at a node of such a tree when 'verified' in some intuitive sense. A general topological framework for placing all these ideas is presented in [15] . A standard version that suffices for our purposes uses partially ordered models M = (W, ≤, V) with a valuation V, setting:
In such partial orders, we can think of the objects s as information stages or information pieces, while models unraveled to trees give a temporal picture of a record of possible investigations. Next, in line with the idea of accumulating certainty in the process of inquiry, the valuation V in these models is persistent, i.e., if M, s |= p and s ≤ t, then also M, t |= p.
The truth definition as stated here lifts this persistence property to all formulas ϕ.
In this modus operandi, in contrast with epistemic logic, there is no separate syntax for knowledge or information -but old logical constants are re-interpreted, making negation and implication sensitive to the information structure of new models with an inclusion order that is absent in models for classical logic. In particular, an intuitionistic negation ¬ϕ says that the formula ϕ is not just 'not true', but that it will never become true at any further stage along the inclusion ordering. Also, failure of classical definability equivalences leads to fine-structure for classical notions like implication, which can now be viewed in several non-equivalent ways.
This 'meaning loading' of the classical operators makes the intuitionistic laws for negation and implication deviate from classical logic. Now earlier points become precise. Famously, this semantics invalidates the law of Excluded Middle ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, as this disjunction fails at states where ϕ is not yet verified though it will later become so. These deviations from classical logic are informative in telling us implicitly about properties of knowledge. Failure of Excluded Middle says that agents cannot decide everything a priori. Thus meaning loading makes the remaining validities informative (they now say something new), and more mysteriously, it packs information in the absence of classical laws -like dogs that do not bark in the night-time.
At the same time, even though the classical language is not extended, there is an increase in expressive power, since classical laws fail now. For instance, ϕ → ψ is not equivalent to either ¬ϕ ∨ ψ or ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ): intuitionistic logic has more implications than classical logic. This is an implicit counterpart to explicit language extension.
Remark This brief exposition of intuitionistic logic does not do justice to its deep connections with proof theory, universal algebra, and category theory, or to the many surprising effects of working in mathematical theories on top of a weaker base logic. See the encyclopedic source [47] for a wide-ranging exposition.
The explicit/implicit contrast: epistemic logic versus intuitionistic logic
So, now we have encountered two major research paradigms in the field of logic, both meant to take information and knowledge seriously -but doing so in very different ways. Let us highlight the major differences that showed in the above:
epistemic logic explicit, conservative language extension of classical logic intuitionistic logic implicit, meaning change old language, non-classical logic
Highlighting the distinction, consider the fact that we do not know the answer to every question, and maybe never will. This showed as follows in intuitionistic logic.
Excluded Middle ϕ ∨int ¬int ϕ was not valid -where indices highlight the fact that the failure occurs on the intuitionistic understanding of negation and disjunctionthough special cases of this principle may, and do, remain valid. In contrast with this, the law of Excluded Middle is unrestrictedly valid in epistemic logic, but it
should not be confused with the invalid epistemic formula Kϕ ∨class K¬class ϕ.
Much more can be said about these two approaches to knowledge and information.
But for the purposes of this paper, we will just stipulate that both are based on stable interesting sets of intuitions, both have generated a rich mathematical theory, and both seem bona fide instances of a logical modus operandi in system design.
With this single illustration, we hope the reader has grasped the methodological point we are after -and in later sections, we will now explore the 'implicit' versus 'explicit' contrast in other cases, adding more depth to what it involves.
Choice or co-existence: translations and merges
But first it may seem time for a choice. Is intuitionistic logic or epistemic logic better or deeper as an analysis of information and knowledge? Should we prefer one over the other? Many philosophers think this way, but we feel that this adversarial attitude is not very productive, and it also runs counter to known mathematical facts about system connections (for a similar, but more general criticism, cf. [29] ).
Already in Gödel's seminal [26] , there is a faithful translation from intuitionistic logic into the modal logic S4 whose underlying intuition follows the present knowledge perspective. We now look at this connection to see what it achieves.
Translating IL into EL The Gödel translation t turns the intuitionistic truth definition into a syntactic recipe. Atoms p go to modal formulas ☐p, upward persistent on partial orders, conjunctions remain conjunctions, disjunctions remain disjunctions, intuitionistic negations ¬ϕ go to modalized classical negations ☐¬ϕ, and intuitionistic implications ϕ → ψ go to modalized classical implications ☐(ϕ → ψ). Using IL for the standard proof system of intuitionistic propositional logic, we then have:
This explains key features of intuitionistic logic in modal terms. E.g., varieties of implication place different demands on knowledge: intuitionistic ϕ → ψ is ☐(ϕ → ψ), ¬ϕ ∨ ψ the stronger ☐¬ϕ ∨ ψ, and ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) the weaker ☐(ϕ → ♢ψ). Also, intuitionistic laws like ¬ϕ ↔ ¬¬¬ϕ are special cases of the fact that S4 has 14 non-equivalent iterations of modalities. But intuitively, the modal setting is richer, as it also supports reasoning about non-persistent formulas that can become false at later stages. Thus, its theory of inquiry allows for revision, not just cumulative update. into the modal world of S4, we have gone a certain way toward adopting the intuitionistic mind set of inquiry. We will return to this theme presently.
Uses of translations
From translating to merging Finally, moving away from reduction, a weaker but still significant contact between explicit and implicit logics is compatibility. Can such systems be merged in meaningful ways? Intuitionistic modal logics have long existed, and hybrids of explicit and implicit logics keep emerging, as we will see later on. Often this juxtaposition seems routine, but hybrids can also be natural.
Dynamic logic of information change
Having introduced our explicit/implicit contrast for two well-known logics, we now move to more recent developments and see where it leads. We start by noting that inquiry lies at the heart of both epistemic and intuitionistic logic. Clearly, knowledge and information do not function in isolation, but in an ongoing dynamic process of informational action, or in a social setting, interaction between agents.
Statics and dynamics Key informational actions that guide agents come in three
kinds that work together in many natural scenarios. Acts of inference matter -but equally important are acts of observation, and of communication. Such actions, or other events that embody them, are studied in current dynamic-epistemic logics, by adding an explicit vocabulary for the core actions to existing logical systems, and then analyzing the major laws of knowledge change, cf. the broad study [11] .
Model update Here is a system making the dynamic actions behind basic epistemic logic explicit by representing informational action as model change. The simplest case of such a change occurs with a public announcement or a similar public event !ϕ that produces hard information, where one learns with total reliability that ϕ is the case. This eliminates all worlds in the current model where ϕ is false:
As we said when motivating epistemic models, getting information by shrinking a range of options is a common idea in many disciplines, that works for information flow by being told or through observation. We can call this hard information because of its irrevocable character: the update step eliminates all counter-examples.
Public announcement logic Public announcements are studied in PAL, a system that extends epistemic logic with a dynamic modality for truthful announcements:
This dynamic modality has a complete logic that can analyze delicate phenomena, such as complex epistemic assertions, say of current ignorance, changing truth value under update. This typically shows in order dependence: a sequence !¬Kp ; !p makes sense, but !p ; !¬Kp is contradictory. Here we only display the 'recursion law' for knowledge after update, which is the basic dynamic equation of hard information:
Together with the S5-laws for epistemic logic plus simple axioms for Boolean compounds after update this gives a complete axiomatization for PAL. Another interesting law demonstrating the dynamics of PAL governs iterated updates:
Recursion axioms reduce formulas with dynamic operators to static base formulas, so the extension of our classical base logic is conservative in the usual explicit style.
General dynamics
There is a method here. One 'dynamifies' a given static logic, making its underlying actions explicit and defining them as model transformations.
The heart of the dynamic logic is then a compositional analysis of post-conditions for the key actions via recursion laws. This leads to conservative extensions of the base logic, though some dynamic-epistemic systems force redesign of the base language, while some recent semantics no longer support all-out reduction. Many further notions can be treated in this style, such as changes in agents' beliefs, inferences, agenda issues, or preferences -where one often changes the ordering of a current model rather than eliminating worlds. Moreover, extended dynamic logics also deal with public and private events in rich multi-agent scenarios such as games. 
Digression: explicitizing the explicit

Implicit dynamics in intuitionistic logic
We have now extended epistemic logic, an explicit approach to knowledge, to a dynamic logic with explicit informational actions. Is there an implicit counterpart?
Given our earlier discussion, it makes sense to search in the realm of intuitionism.
We could just add the actions of PAL to intuitionistic logic, [3] . But can we be more implicit about actions, without putting them explicitly into the syntax?
Teasing out the hidden actions Intuitionistic models represent a process of inquiry, with endpoints as final stages where we know the truth about all proposition letters. What are the implicit steps in the background of such a process taking us from node to node? Moves from one state to a successor come in two kinds.
Example
The hidden dynamics of intuitionistic models.
Consider two models M1, M2, where the first refutes the classical double negation law ¬¬p → p, and the second the law of 'weak excluded middle' ¬p ∨ ¬¬p:
The annotations say that the two branches of M2 may be viewed as public announcements of which endpoints, viewed as classical valuations, the process can get to.
This is like PAL-style learning by elimination of worlds. But in other intuitionistic steps, like the one in M1, there is no such elimination of endpoints, and we merely get more proposition letters true at the next stage. One might explain this move as a new type of informational action, namely, 'awareness raising' #ϕ that some fact ϕ is the case, where awareness involves syntactic in addition to semantic information.
Factual and procedural information
But there is more than mere transposing of concerns from dynamic-epistemic logic. The tree structure of intuitionistic models registers two notions of semantic information on a par, a distinction also found in epistemic inquiry with long-term scenarios in learning theory, [33] :
(a) factual information about how the world is, (b) procedural information about our current investigative process.
How we can get knowledge matters, not just what is the case. While endpoints record eventual factual information states, the branching tree structure of intuitionistic models, both its available and its missing intermediate stages, encodes further non-trivial information: viz. agents' knowledge about the process of inquiry.
This challenges simple views of how intuitionistic and epistemic logic connect. The epistemic logic for semantic information is S5, and the fact that the Gödel translation takes us into S4 reflects a view of intuitionistic models as temporal processes of inquiry. Thus, an explicit counterpart to intuitionistic logic needs a temporal version of dynamic epistemic logic. Indeed, temporal `protocol models' with designated admissible histories satisfying constraints on inquiry, [11] , model procedural information in long-term processes of inquiry or learning beyond local dynamic steps.
Thus, both epistemic logic and intuitionistic logic have dynamic extensions having to do with inquiry, and these can be developed in both explicit and implicit styles.
Moreover, this process is not routine and interesting new issues come to the fore.
Dynamic semantics, meaning as information change potential
Intuitionistic logic is not the only vehicle for a meaningful comparison with PAL.
Explicit logics need not have unique implicit companions, there may be more matchings. Indeed, the more striking implicit counterpart to dynamic epistemic logics may well be another logical paradigm, that we will discuss now, raising new issues.
Here is a fundamental idea from the area of dynamic semantics of natural language, going back to classical sources like [28] , [48] . The guiding intuition of this approach to language involves communication-oriented 'information change potential':
The meaning of an expression is its potential for changing information states of someone who accepts the information conveyed by the expression.
This sounds like a plea for taking informational actions seriously, as we did in the preceding section. But this time, they are treated, not by adding new operators, but implicitly, by loading the meanings of classical vocabulary with dynamic features.
Dynamic semantics comes in many forms. We will use Veltman's propositional update logic US for a comparison with the explicit PAL approach. Here, on a universe of information states (in the simplest case, sets of valuations), each propositional formula ϕ induces a state transformation [[ϕ] ] by the following recursion:
[[ϕ∨ψ]](S) = [[ϕ]](S) ∪ [[ψ]](S) [[ϕ∧ψ]](S) = [[ψ]][[ϕ]](S), [[♢ϕ]](S) = S, if [[ϕ]](S)≠∅, and ∅, otherwise.
Conjunction now stands for a dynamic notion: sequential composition of actions, while an existential modality becomes a 'test' on the current information state.
As with intuitionistic logic, these new meanings for old operators result in deviations from classical logic. In particular, conjunction is no longer commutative, reflecting the typical order dependence of dynamic acts. Facts about the informational process are now encoded in the logic of the logical operators in this system. This encoding becomes even more pronounced with a new dynamic consequence saying that, after processing the successive premises, the conclusion has no further effect: Dynamic semantics keeps the actions implicit, while giving the old language of propositional logic richer dynamic meanings supporting a new notion of consequence, with a technical theory that differs from standard propositional logic.
Dynamic epistemic logic makes the actions explicit, provides them with explicit recursion laws, extends the old base language while retaining the old meanings for it, and in all this, it still works with standard consequence.
As before, this is not just a matter of attaching two labels `implicit' and `explicit'.
Seeing things in terms of our contrast leads to new questions and open problems.
One straightforward consequence concerns system design.
Inquiry and questions A current innovation in dynamic semantics is inquisitive semantics for natural language, [18] , where formulas get richer 'inquisitive meanings' reflecting their role in, not just conveying information, but also in directing discourse. The resulting logic is a non-classical intermediate logic related to Medvedev's logic of problems from the intuitionistic tradition. Our analysis then suggests the design of an explicit counterpart. Such dynamic-epistemic logics of inquiry -not tied to natural language, but closer to epistemology and learning theory -involve explicit acts of 'issue management', where questions and related actions modify current issue structures on top of epistemic models, [14] , [30] .
In the remainder of this section, we go into more depth on the foundational issue of how the two views of dynamics are related, and show new issues that emerge.
Translations between US and S5
As with epistemic and intuitionistic logic, there are translations between dynamic semantics and dynamic-epistemic logic, but they involve new issues. Our first observation comes from [9] :
Fact There is a faithful translation from update-validity into the modal logic S5.
The following is a recursive map tr from propositional formulas ϕ to modal formulas tr(ϕ)(q), where q is a fresh proposition letter (note the clause for conjunction):
Then the following holds, for models M whose domain is a set S denoted by q,
[[ϕ]](S) = {s ∈ S | M, s |= tr(ϕ)}
As a corollary, for update validity, we have that
In fact, connections run both ways. There is also a converse embedding:
Fact There is a faithful translation from S5-validity into update validity.
To see this, transform S5-formulas ϕ into their normal form nf(ϕ) of modal depth 1. System identity Now an earlier issue returns. Do the preceding results say that US is the same system as S5? Our translations reduce valid consequence both ways, which is enough for the standard notion of system equivalence. But the intuitive novelty of US is that it does something more: it can express the dynamics of model change.
However, the details of our first translation give information about this aspect, too:
S5 can define model changes in ambient sets q using the formulas tr(ϕ) as indicated, and this process even simulates the working of US in a recursive manner.
And yet the two systems feel intensionally different, and US seems a new discovery.
I must leave this matter of finer intensional differences open here, but will return to the issue of comparing dynamic components by drawing in the logic PAL.
PAL and S5 Similar points can be made concerning public announcement logic.
Fact There are faithful translations between PAL-validity and modal S5.
This time, the reason is that the recursion laws provide an effective truth-preserving translation from all PAL-formulas with dynamic modalities into the S5 base language, while for that static fragment, PAL is a conservative extension of S5. There is an obstacle. Update semantics recurses on the structure of propositional formulas viewed as updates, whereas PAL does not recurse on inner structure of announcements !ϕ, but on post-conditions ψ for modalities [!ϕ]ψ. Hence, we enrich PAL with 'conversational programs' built from actions !ϕ by standard operations of union and sequential composition. The following translation can then be defined:
Comparing US and PAL directly
Tr(p) = !p Tr(¬ϕ) = !¬<Tr(ϕ)>T Tr(ϕ∨ψ) = Tr(ϕ) ∪ Tr(ψ) Tr(♢ϕ) = !♢<Tr(ϕ)>T
Tr(ϕ∧ψ) = Tr(ϕ) ; Tr(ψ)
Now it is easy to show that, for models M whose domain is the set S, for US. E.g., the logic of PAL extended with conversational programs that allow finite iterations is non-axiomatizable and not arithmetically definable, [38] . So, dynamic semantics for discourse rather than sentences might run the same complexity risk.
[[ϕ]](S) = {s ∈ S | M, s |= <Tr(ϕ)>T}
But earlier reservations apply: despite the translations, US and PAL seem intuitively different. For instance, recall our notion of 'procedural information' in intuitionistic models. Viewing PAL as a logic of inquiry, a generalized semantics of 'protocol models' with restricted temporal histories of updates makes sense, [11] . This natural change in models changes the laws of PAL, and it blocks the translation of PAL into S5. However, it is unclear if protocol models make sense in dynamic semantics.
Also, PAL update has a natural extension to dynamic-epistemic logics with much more drastic model changes modeling the dynamics of partly private information, and it is unclear if this richer dynamics has any role in a dynamic semantics.
What these two examples suggest is a more demanding criterion of system identity: equality or difference in 'natural generalizations'. But is there a formal basis to this, or would the criterion merely concern our current powers of imagination?
Remark There are also other translations between systems of dynamic semantics and explicit logics, such as the translation of dynamic predicate logic, [28] , into propositional dynamic logic of programs, given in [21] , and yet other kinds exist.
We found natural translations between dynamic semantics and dynamic-epistemic logics. Still, implicit and explicit approaches do not collapse, and again we might be content with creating merges. Either way, the realm of information dynamics seems a rich source for our explicit/implicit contrast, raising interesting issues of its own. Dynamic logics of soft information
Our discussion so far centered on the statics and dynamics of knowledge. However, the implicit/explicit contrast applies just as well to logics of belief, perhaps the more important attitude in agency. The case of belief shows interesting new features and suggests new comparisons between implicit and explicit logic systems. We start with belief dynamics in explicit style, moving to implicit counterparts later.
Belief and conditional belief Epistemic-doxastic models for belief order the earlier bare epistemic ranges by a relation of 'relative plausibility' ≤ xy between worlds x, y.
These models interpret operators of absolute and conditional belief:
M, s |= Bϕ iff M, t |= ϕ for all t ~ s maximal in the order ≤ on {u | u ~ s}
M, s |= B ψ ϕ iff M, t |= ϕ for all ≤-maximal t in {u | s ~ u and M, u |= ψ}
But there is a richer repertoire of epistemic notions available on this models. For instance, on binary world-independent orderings, a good addition is 'safe belief', a standard modality intermediate in strength between knowledge and belief:
M, s |= [≤]ϕ iff M, t |= ϕ for all t with s ≤ t
Logics for conditional belief are like those of [36] , [17] . For a more general picture of natural modalities that can be defined on these models, see [4] .
Belief change under hard information Beliefs guide our decisions and actions,
going beyond what we know. But beliefs can be wrong, and new information can lead to correction and learning. One trigger for belief revision are the earlier public announcements. Here is the recursion law governing the matching model changes:
A similar principle for updating conditional beliefs axiomatizes the system completely. There is also a recursion law for safe belief under public announcement, which is even simpler. The following equivalence holds on plausibility models:
Belief change under soft information But richer belief models also support new transformations. In addition to hard information, there is soft information, when we take a signal as serious, but not infallible. Its mechanism is not eliminating worlds, but changing plausibility order. A widely used soft update is 'radical upgrade':
⇑ϕ changes a current model M to M⇑ϕ, where all ϕ-worlds become better than all ¬ϕ-worlds; within these zones, the old order remains.
The dynamic modality for radical upgrade is interpreted as follows:
M, s |= [⇑ϕ]ψ iff M⇑ϕ, s |= ψ
and its dynamic logic can again be axiomatized completely using recursion laws.
Logics of belief change Recursion laws exist for belief changes under a wide variety of soft events representing different levels of trust or acceptance for new information, [4] , [25] . An area where this variety makes special sense is Learning Theory, [24] : different update rules induce different policies for reaching true belief in the limit. The Handbook [19] has details on the landscape of modal logics for belief change, plus connections with AGM-style postulational approaches.
The systems presented here are explicit in a double sense. Not only do events and acts that usually stay in the background of logical systems become first-class objects of study, but also, dynamic logics for knowledge and belief have explicit syntax and laws for these actions. The new structure is not put into the meanings of the original language, and so we get conservative extensions of earlier static logics, although sometimes there is a need for some redesign of the original static vocabulary.
11
Non-monotonic consequence relations as implicit devices
Next, how can we do belief revision in an alternative implicit style? One line runs via dynamic semantics, with new meanings for linguistic expressions such as epistemic modals, [42] , [48] , [49] . All our earlier points apply, but we will not pursue them
here. Instead, we show how our contrast can also take us, perhaps surprisingly, to an area of implicit logic that seems quite different from those discussed so far.
Varieties of consequence
In the 1980s, the study of different consequence relations modeling varieties of common sense-based problem solving started in Artificial
Intelligence, and it has since entered other fields. In particular, the consequence notion of circumscription [37] , [45] says that, in problem solving or related tasks, the following inferences are allowed:
A conclusion need not be true in all models of the premises, but only in the most preferred, or most plausible models.
Thus, problem solving involves only inspection of currently most relevant cases.
This style of reasoning deviates from classical logic. In particular, it is 'non-monotonic': a conclusion C may follow from a premise P in this sense, but it may fail to follow from the extended set of premises P, Q. For, the maximal models within the set of models for the conjunction P ∧ Q need not be maximal among the models of P. Making it explicit Can we provide alternative explicit accounts leaving the notion of consequence standard, while adding vocabulary to bring out the origins of the new consequence notions? Of course, we need a guiding semantic perspective for doing so, and this will depend on the precise motivation for the new consequence relation.
In the following case study, we concentrate on the role of belief in circumscriptionthough explicitizing consequence relations may well involve other notions, too. Incidentally, this simple analysis is not the only explicit view of belief and nonmonotonic logic. In [34] , default reasoning only submits candidates for belief while further inference sifts available evidence that supports the eventual beliefs.
From inference to belief change
Remark There are well-known analogies between non-monotonic consequence and conditionals in the style of Lewis [36] . Instead of [!ϕ]Bψ, this might favor conditional belief B ψ ϕ pre-encoding effects of learning that ψ. The two versions are not quite the same, as update !ψ restricts a model to its ψ-worlds, while a conditional can still look at ¬ψ-worlds when evaluating ϕ. But these details need not concern us here.
Either way, our general points apply. The juxtaposition of perspectives raises interesting issues. Again we see a trade-off between implicit and explicit approaches:
nonstandard consequence old classical language, deviant rules of reasoning explicit dynamic reanalysis new language with belief and action modalities, consequence is just classical consequence.
On the second approach, non-standard reasoning is a mixture of classical reasoning and further features of informational actions, not a family of radical alternatives.
Dynamic logics of belief change enrich the original language with informational events and attitude changes, but then work conservatively with a classical consequence relation, explaining deviant features of non-standard consequence by attitude and information change through the recursion laws for the new dynamic operators. In the following section, we evaluate this difference in approaches.
Comparisons and switches
We have seen that non-monotonic consequence relations can be translated faithfully into a classical logic with operators for attitudes and informational events. But as before, this does not identify the two perspectives: one can still have advantages over the other. For instance, implicit approaches focus on structural rules, which are a natural high-level vantage point allowing for elegant theory. On the other hand, an explicit dynamic approach provides an emancipation of informational events in problem solving that is of interest per se, as it adds new events beyond inference.
New dynamic logics A neutral two-way view here sees switching perspectives, [11] .
In one direction, given an implicit non-standard notion of consequence, one can tease out informational or other events motivating it, and write their explicit dynamic logic. This style of analysis, backed up by mathematical representation theorems, replaces non-standard deviation from classical logic into dynamic extension of classical logic. Explicit events behind non-standard notions of consequence are sometimes easy to find, as in the above analysis of circumscription, but there is no automatic method for this art -and there are unresolved challenges concerning major substructural logics, [41] . In particular, no explicit-style dynamic reanalysis seems to be known so far for linear logic, whose non-classical notion of consequence is primarily based on proof-theoretic resource intuitions. Different structural rules will then encode differences in the underlying process of drawing a conclusion. Thus, we generate new notions of consequence, and more would arise by using other mixtures of knowledge, belief and update actions.
New notions of consequence
Thus, in the study of consequence relations, implicit and explicit approaches live in harmony, and we can often perform a Gestalt switch from one to the other. Such switches also suggest precise mathematical system translations in our earlier sense.
Philosophical repercussions
While the preceding analysis may seem just technical, well-known positions based on non-standard logics may come under pressure by an explicit-style reanalysis. In particular, existence of different consequence relations on a par has led to the thesis of Logical Pluralism, a view that logic should acknowledge competing views on the nature of logical consequence, and perhaps also other core notions of the field, [8] . But in our view, this grand conclusion depends on taking the implicit methodology for granted. On a dynamic explicit re-analysis as presented here, the competition between consequence relations disappears, and we get compatible extensions of classical logic without any commitment to competition.
The second view need not be superior to the first, but its very existence undermines strong conclusions arising from looking at consequence in only one stance.
Further examples
We have seen how the implicit/explicit contrast runs through both static and dynamic logics for knowledge and belief, as well as for logics for consequence relations.
Further examples in this epistemic line can be found by moving from information flow to agency and games: in the monograph [12] , implicit logic games and explicit game logics are naturally entangled strands throughout. But once one sees the contrast, it applies to any part of logic whatsoever, not just information and agency.
We show this with two examples, from the philosophy of physics and from metaphysics. Again, these raise new issues of their own that we will only touch upon.
Quantum logic Our first example concerns a stronghold of non-classical logic since the 1930s. Consider the field of quantum logic, where the classical distributive law
fails in the domain of physical quantum phenomena. There are of course reasons for this failure: measurements disturb the current state of a physical system -but this is left implicit in quantum logic. There is a long tradition of research in this area, which has resulted in an extensive algebraic and modal theory of quantum logics.
The first explicit companion to all this seems the dynamic measurement logic of Baltag and Smets, cf. [5] . Their system of 'quantum PDL' has dynamic modalities for measurement actions that satisfy perspicuous laws mirroring physical quantum facts, but it remains squarely based on classical logic. In doing so, it explains all the deviant features of quantum logic in a uniform manner as properties of a small frag- This brief exposition may not do justice to explicit quantum dynamic logic, but suffice it to say that this new approach placing measurement actions and quantum information flow at center stage is more than just logic-internal system redesign.
It fits well with a substantive topic, viz. recent investigations into analogies between the foundations of quantum mechanics and theories of computation.
Truth maker semantics Our second example shows our contrast at work in a very recent development. `Truth maker semantics' has been touted as a hyper-intensional paradigm springing the bounds of standard modal logic, cf. [23] and related papers. In our terms, truth maker semantics is an implicit approach to describing metaphysical (or, in some intended applications, epistemic) structure, changing the meanings of the logical constants, and defining new notions of consequence based on these. So, it makes sense to look for a translation from truth maker logic into an explicit companion, namely, a standard modal logic over the same class of models.
We give a brief explanation of how this can be done for one simple system. Models for truth making M are tuples (S, ≤, V) with objects s in S viewed as parts of the world or abstract states. The binary relation ≤ is a partial order between states.
The relation of supremum s = sup(t, u) (lowest upper bound) says that object s is a sum or merge of the t and u. It is often assumed in the literature that all suprema exist, often as 'impossible worlds' in case the merged states are incompatible.
The simplest relevant language here is a propositional logic with connectives ¬, ∧, ∨.
For atomic p, a valuation V records which states in S make p true, the set V + (p), or false, V -(p). This can be made subject to further constraints: for instance, that no state makes a proposition both true and false. The truth definition is this: It is easy to show that <sup>pq is not definable in the temporal modal language, making this a natural extension of the ordinary modal logic S4.
As for laws of reasoning, the modal logic of information has interesting validities, but details are not relevant here. One principle that fails though is associativity:
The reason is that, unlike in truth maker semantics, we do not demand existence of all suprema in our partial orders. The modal logic of information structures is axiomatizable, but a major open problem is whether it is decidable. It is known that logics with associative modalities can often encode undecidable word problems, which might be a warning sign for impossible worlds as suprema in truth making.
Translating truth maker logic into modal information logic The models just described and their modal logic are an explicit companion to truth maker logic. And the connection is very close. Here is a two-component recipe for translating from implicit truthmaker logic into explicit modal logic, where the simultaneous use of variants + and -is a standard trick in reducing three-valued logic to classical logics.
Take new proposition letters p + and p -for each atomic proposition letter p. Now, for each propositional formula ϕ, we recursively extend this double set-up as follows, closely following the above truth definition: We summarize a few strands that occurred in the preceding sections.
Finding complementary analyses
If we see one stance on a topic, we can usually find a dual one. Thus our contrast becomes a force for logical system design. We saw this with dynamic semantics of questions, which suggested an explicit companion logic of issue modifying events. And conversely, explicit logics of belief change suggested new implicit notions of consequence in the area of non-monotonic logic.
Transfer of ideas Different stances on the same thing facilitate creative borrowing, since their agendas may differ. For instance, epistemic logic has a rich tradition of multi-agent and group knowledge. Intuitionistic logic can then profit from the same ideas, creating accounts of mathematics closer to research as a social activity, cf. [2] .
But one can also borrow ideas inside one stance. For instance, intuitionistic logic started from the proof-theoretic BHK interpretation of the logical constants, which met up with semantics only afterwards. Could a similar proof-theoretic analysis apply to dynamic semantics, a major implicit paradigm for information dynamics?
Or, for another example inside the implicit realm: can BHK-style proof analysis be taken to non-monotonic logics, and thus to belief rather than knowledge?
Translation and identity criteria for logics The explicit/implicit contrast also suggests new mathematical issues of translation or reduction between logical systems.
We have given some new examples, and no doubt much more can be proved about translating between implicit and explicit logics. Even so, there is no automatic algorithm for turning one sort of system into the other. Finding illuminating counterparts as we have done is an art rather than a science, and it may well remain so.
We have also suggested that, even when two implicit and explicit logics can be mutually embedded under translation, intensional differences may remain. Here we encountered a general issue in the foundations of logic. There is no generally accepted criterion for when two (presentations of) logical systems should count as the same.
Mutual interpretability is a significant notion of equivalence that allows for much transfer of information, so we should always see if it occurs, but it need not be the last word. In fact, one vexing problem that makes it hard to judge how good this notion is has to do with a scarcity of negative results. There are no general methods showing non-translatability between logical systems. Perhaps, in the end, there is too much translatability in the realm of logics, and a finer sieve is needed.
Merging
Where we cannot translate different stances into each other, a weaker connection is compatibility in meaningful merges. Many systems in the literature combine implicit and explicit features: intuitionistic modal logics, [20] , merged logic games and game logics, [1] , dynamic-epistemic inquisitive logics, [43] , joint lineartemporal logics, and so on. Often, these merges feel natural. A recent case is the intuitionistically flavored possibility semantics for classical logic in [13] , [44] .
We conclude with two other aspects of the interplay of implicit and explicit stances.
Understanding the co-existence
We have noted the existence of our contrast, but we have not offered an explanation of why it is there. It has been suggested by readers of this paper that the background may lie in some well-known distinctions in logic and philosophy. One is that between reasoning with, from an internal firstperson perspective, and reasoning about, from an external third-person perspective.
Implicit logics might give the reasoning with, and explicit ones reasoning about. But while this seems appealing, it does not quite fit. For instance, epistemic logic with operators can also be used in first-person mode, and on the other hand, say, dynamic semantics has also been applied to third-person discourse.
Another distinction that seems relevant is that between object language and metalanguage. We can formalize the meta-language of the semantics for a logical system in some other logic -the 'standard translation' for modal logic is a typical example, [16] . Is the meta-logic then the explicit version of an implicit object logic? Some studies at the interface of logic and games point this way. For instance, the modaldynamic game logic of [40] formalizes part of the meta-theory of first-order evaluation games. Vice versa, game logics induce logic games, implicit practices for their semantics -and this design cycle can be iterated, cf. the program of [12] . Even so, a complete identification does not fit all cases we discussed. It is not at all clear in which sense, say, dynamic-epistemic logic is the meta-logic of dynamic semantics.
Choosing locally Co-existence means that both implicit and explicit stances have intrinsic value, but even so, particular areas may bring further reasons for using one rather than the other. For instance, are there favored stances in human cognition?
Indeed, it has been claimed that natural language conveys much information implicitly, perhaps for ease of coding. Implicit logics would then model this reality directly, whereas explicit logics of information and agency are outside theorists' views of language. But this does not fit the facts. Natural language is a medium where both stances occur, in the guise of one might call participating versus observing modes. A key feature to keep in mind here is the universality of language.
We switch between these two modes all the time, while staying inside the same medium of communication. There may be local cognitive preferences between going explicit or implicit, but we doubt they can be justified in a sweeping manner.
Conclusion
We have identified a significant methodological contrast running through logic, between implicit and explicit stances. We use the word 'stance' here, and not 'system', because we do not identify logic with a family of formal systems. Some logical systems can indeed be called implicit or explicit, but the contrast as we have discussed it also applies to broader workings habits in logical analysis.
Either way, seeing the contrast reveals patterns running through the field of logic, and it suggests new questions of a conceptual and technical nature. We have shown this in a number of concrete instances of system design and in translations between systems. So, seeing the contrast means work to be done, and in fact, we see it as a force toward a better understanding of the coherence of logic, both in its systems and working habits. Moreover, we have pointed out in various illustrations that the contrast has philosophical consequences, since it undercuts sweeping ideological views that are tacitly based on taking one stance while ignoring the other.
